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ABSTRACT
New transport infrastructure has a myriad of effects. This paper briefly introduces three main
models and their interactions to determine the wider economic effects: a commuter location
model predicts the spatial reactions of the working population, and an interregional
monopolistic competition equilibrium model estimates the reactions of firms and the related
changes in consumer welfare. A second run of the commuter location model translates the
estimated labour demand changes into labour migration, and interregional multiplier matrix
translates the migration effects into consumption expenditure effects. Finally, regional
unemployment-vacancy regime switch models are used to estimate efficiency effects on the
imperfect labour market.
With these models two magnetic levitation rail projects, with two variants each, are
investigated: an urban conglomeration project connecting the largest cities within a densely
populated region and a centre-periphery project connecting a central region with a peripheral
region, both in the Netherlands. The empirical outcomes provide new insights into the spatial
pattern of the effects on labour supply and demand. An integral cost-benefit analysis throws
more light on which projects are worthwhile or should be rejected. The centre-periphery
project appears to be worthwhile if its route is carefully chosen. The urban conglomeration
project appears to be doubtful, as it is rather risky.
In addition, it is argued that a project connecting two large, but distant cities probably
would be rejected. Finally, the Newbery critique on the usefulness of integral cost-benefit
analysis is shown to be premature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Two seminal reports (SACTRA, 1999; CPB/NEI, 2000) have recently pointed out that
traditional social cost-benefit analysis by no means captures the total of all welfare effects of
large transport schemes. To understand the overall impact of changes in the transportation
network, it is helpful to distinguish direct and indirect effects. Direct economic effects include
investment cost, exploitation cost and revenues, and transport cost and time benefits for
people and freight given existing locations of people and firms. Indirect economic effects
relate to the consequences of the reduction in transport cost and time for production and
location decisions of people and firms, and the subsequent effects on income and employment
of the population at large (Rietveld & Nijkamp, 2000; Oosterhaven &  Knaap, 2002). In
addition, there are both direct and indirect effects external to the market, such as congestion,
safety, pollution and other environmental impacts (cf. SACTRA, 1999; Rothengatter, 2000).
An integral social cost-benefit analysis will include the direct as well as the indirect
responses of economic agents and will relax the assumption of perfect competition where
relevant, such as on many product markets, on the housing market and, especially, on the
labour market. The stipulation on the perfect competition assumption is of great importance,
as estimating the direct costs and benefits alone would only suffice for a full estimate of the
total net welfare effect under perfect competition. By contrast, when the condition of perfect
competition does not hold, indirect responses of economic agents require attention as they
may generate possibly considerable further welfare gains or losses (SACTRA, 1999;
CPB/NEI, 2000).
In 2001, the Dutch government has contemplated the construction of two magnetic
levitation rail (Maglev) projects with each two variant. (1) An inner ring or an outer ring
connecting the four largest cities (Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht) in the
heavily urbanised western part of the Netherlands. (2) A direct connection between Schiphol
Airport in the West and Groningen in the more peripheral, rural North, either running along
the south-east or along the north-west of the “IJsselmeer” lake in the middle of the country.
Recently, a more or less comparable transport scheme been rejected in Germany,
namely the proposed Maglev between two big agglomeration (Hamburg and Berlin) over a
much longer distance with one only intermediate stop. This paper will consider the urban
conglomeration type and the centre-periphery type of Maglev with much more stops. Other
projects are currently under investigation in China, Germany and the USA.
Given the recommendations for appraising the effects of transport improvements on the
economy in the SACTRA report (1999, p.179), the objective of this paper is:
1)  To draw out the rationale for both improvements.
2)  To determine the pattern of gains and losses, in both economic activity and jobs, which
will arise from the improvements.
3)  To make as complete an estimate as possible of the total economic (dis)benefits of both
variants of both projects, taking account of the effects of imperfect competition. This is
termed a fully specified social cost-benefit analysis.3
To reach this aim Section 2 explains the two projects in more detail, and Section 3 draws out
the rationale behind both projects. Section 4 describes the models used to determine the
indirect economic effects, and Section 5 describes the models used to value the (dis)benefits
of these indirect as well as of the direct effects. Section 6 and 7 contain the results of the
empirical analysis of the indirect economic effects and of the estimated cost and benefits of
the two projects and their two variants. Finally, we point out further implications and
conclusions in Section 8 and 9.
2.  THE TWO MAGLEV RAIL INVESTIGATIONS
The research of the magnetic levitation rail system (Maglev) was part of larger investigations
considering different routes, different service levels (frequency, schedule, waiting time),
different price levels as well as different rail systems (also intercity and high-speed rail). This
article picks out the Maglev system and only considers those routes and services that
appeared to be better in the process of these investigations. It also only considers the results
obtained at prevailing prices of public transport, as results for other price schemes are not
available for the indirect economic effect estimates. Occasionally, we refer to other results
obtained within these larger investigations.
Here we consider two magnetic levitation rail projects with each two variants: (1) An
inner ring or an outer ring connecting the four largest cities of the Netherlands: Amsterdam,
The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. The inner ring is shorter and cheaper as it calls at the
edges of Rotterdam and Utrecht, while the outer ring also calls at the city centres of Leiden
and Utrecht. (2) A straight connection between Schiphol Airport and Groningen, either
running along the south-east or along the north-west of the “IJsselmeer” lake in the middle of
the country (see Figure 1).
The cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht are all located in the
Randstad region, the economic core of the Netherlands. This region is highly urbanised with
high densities of both people and economic activities. It covers 41% of Dutch population,
42% of Dutch employment and more than 48% of Dutch GDP, while its surface only covers
15% of national total. Groningen is the largest city located in the North, the poorest region of
the Netherlands. The North is a peripheral region with a rural character, even though its
income share in agriculture is rather small. It covers 10% of Dutch population, 8% of Dutch
employment and 11% of Dutch GDP, while its surface covers 27% of national total.
1
Each project (variant) is evaluated in relation to a baseline scenario. This scenario is
based on the “European Co-ordination” scenario of the CPB (1997). Besides, we also
consider the more pessimistic “Divided Europe” and the more optimistic “Global
Competition” scenario of the CPB (1997). The main characteristics of these scenarios are
reported in table 1. With the help of regional employment allocation and regional population
projection models the total number of expected people and jobs in 2020 from CPB (1997) has
been divided over the 548 municipalities the Netherlands counted in 1998 (see TNO et al.,
                                                                
1 The GDP figure is misleadingly high as it also contains the value added form natural gas exploitation,
from which this region hardly profits.4
2000). The baseline scenario further consists of a projected rail and road network for 2020
with travel times and volumes (see further NEI, 2000a; Elhorst et al. 2000).
It is assumed that the Maglev proposals primarily lead to exogenous changes in the
travel time matrix of public transport. Table 2 gives some representative travel times between
major cities the Maglev would call at. At the same time, the speed and frequency of regular
trains on some competing, existing rail links will decrease due to a reduction of the expected
number of passengers. Besides, some travel times by car along the corridor of the new rail
links will improve due to reduced congestion. The public transport times given include time
necessary to travel to the station of departure and from the station of arrival to the final
destination. Table 2 shows that the travel time by the Maglev falls below the travel time by
car on several connections, even during normal hours, which is quite unique for a public
transport system. The table also shows that the travel time reduction is far more significant for
the connection to the North than for the new connection within the West.
3. THE RATIONALE FOR THE IMPROVEMENTS
The primary objective of a fast rail link within the Randstad is to improve its internal
accessibility by public transport. This in turn may reduce congestion and therefore improve
the Randstad’s internal accessibility by car. Both may strengthen the Randstad’s competitive
position to attract more internationally mobile production activities. Compared to other
regions in the Netherlands, the need for space for the purpose of new residential areas and
industrial sites in the Randstad is considerably larger. With the help of a fast rail link, it might
be possible to direct the urbanisation process away from vulnerable remaining agricultural
and nature areas within the Randstad, which is the secondary objective of this link.
The primary objective of a fast rail link between the Randstad and the North is to
stimulate the northern economy. With a fast rail link, people could relocate to the North while
keeping their current jobs in the Randstad. This increases demand for locally produced goods,
which initiates a multiplier process leading to a higher level of regional production and
employment. A fast rail link would also lower the prices of services to and from firms located
in the North, possibly shifting the balance in favour of location in the North in spite of the
‘two-way road’ argument.
2 This induced activity is seen as the key to further economic
development.
The secondary objective of a fast rail link between the Randstad and the North is to
relieve the Randstad’s capacity constraints in transport  infrastructure, and in land and labour
markets, which result in a losses of time, higher transport costs, labour shortages, soaring housing
prices and higher cost of living. As these costs are partly external to private decision-makers,
they do not fully deter the spatial concentration of people and economic activities, since such
costs are not taken into account in private location decisions. In as far as these factors do
contribute to a flow of industry away from the economic core, they are mostly directed towards
the periphery of the core or towards the core of other countries, but not towards the periphery of
                                                                
2 Improved accessibility may also benefit the central region to the  disbenefit of the periphery
(SACTRA, 1999, p.16).5
the country itself ( Fothergill et al. 1986, Clark 1989, pp.23-25, Marshall & Wood 1995,
Boeckhout & Haverkate 1995, p.165).
4. INDIRECT ECONOMIC EFFECTS: METHODOLOGY
The indirect economic effects of an infrastructure improvement may be summarised and
modelled as two relatively independent main effects on population and on employment and
two derived interaction effects (see figure 2).
The first main effect relates to housing migration of the working population. When travel
times reduce due to improvements in the transportation network, people may increase the
quality of their housing accommodation and living environment, by increasing their
commuting journey length, without changing their commuting journey time. This principle
has been used to develop a commuter location model that takes actual commuting behaviour
as given and then try to predict where people live given the location of their jobs. It takes the
commuting journey time distribution by different transport modes (car during peak hours,
public transport and slow transport) as given, and then assigns the jobs in each employment
municipality to the same or other residential municipality (see Elhorst and Oosterhaven, 2002
for details).
The commuting time distribution matrix used gives the percentage of workers that
commutes by one of the three modes of transport split into 25 time classes. This matrix has
been further split for the four biggest cities, for municipalities with a railway station and for
municipalities without a railway station. The total matrix is based on more than 70,000
observations (CBS, 1999). It has been assumed that this matrix does not change over time.
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The time the average individual spends on travel remained remarkably stable over long
periods of time despite enormous increases in incomes and the average speed of transport
(Hupkes, 1977;  Zahavi and  McLynn, 1983; SACTRA, 1999, p.118). Journey-to-work
statistics from the US Census, for example, show that mean commuting time in the largest 15
metropolitan areas increased only slightly, from 26.0 to 26.6 minutes between 1980 and 1990
(quoted from Small & Gómez-Ibánaz, 1999, p.1941).
Finally, it has been taken into account that municipalities may have a different
attractiveness as a residential area, which may be measured by either the number of houses or
the available land (excluding water). The first variable best approximates the existing physical
possibilities to live within a municipality. For this reason this variable is suitable to test the fit
of the model. It appeared that the working age population living in the 12 nuts-2 and the 40
nuts-3 regions of the Netherlands with this attractiveness variable could be estimated with an
error 7%. The second variable better approximates the spatial preferences of people. Research
has shown that the majority of the working population has a preference for more comfortable
houses built on larger lots in neighbourhoods with more green (Elhorst et al. 1999; VROM,
2000). For this reason the second variable is more suitable to simulate longer run residential
changes, provided that the housing market has time to adjust itself to the changes in the
transport system and to these residential preferences.
                                                                
3 Shifts within this matrix are nonetheless possible, as people may change their mode of transport.
Modal substitution has been modelled with the help of an almost ideal demand system (see Elhorst and
Oosterhaven, 2002).6
The second main effect relates to travel cost induced employment changes. Traditional
approaches to the role of transport costs in the determination of levels of economic activity
assume that firms will attempt to minimise transport costs of reaching markets and acquiring
inputs for a given level of activity. If the transport costs of factor inputs and outputs change
differentially in different locations, the optimal location of the firm would be expected to
change. Transport at the firm level will include both freight transport and personal business
travel. In this investigation, we have used a  bi-modal (commodities/people) transport cost
mark-up:
[ ] [ ] , p ) d ( f ) d ( f p
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where p gives the share of commodity transport and 1-p the share of business/shoping travel
in the total transportation cost per sector. The following functional form is assumed:
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where u and w denote parameters to be estimated for freight and business/shopping travel and
d denotes distance. For freight, the 548·548 municipality-by-municipality distance matrix has
been used. For people, the 548·548 travel time matrix by car during normal hours and the
548·548 travel time matrix by public transport have been used weighted by their modal
shares in business/shopping travel. Note that in the project variants only the latter matrix
changes and that the modal shares may change due to substitution between the two modes of
transport.
Imperfect competition in transport-using sectors is an important reason why traditional
location approaches may produce inaccurate estimates. In the long run, changes in market
access lead to entry and exit. When inter-industry linkages are reckoned with, forward and
backward linkage lead to cluster and agglomeration formation. In general, a more integrated
market tends to support more firms, which charge lower prices, produce at a larger scale, and
offer a wider variety of products. To estimate these effects a  spatial computable general
equilibrium model (SCGE model) has been developed (see Knaap and Oosterhaven, 2000, for
details).
This SGCE model fits in the new economic geography literature (cf. Fujita, Krugman and
Venables, 1999) and directly extends the model introduced by  Venables (1996). The basic
structure resembles a similar model developed for the European Union by Bröcker (1999), but
is more detailed in that fourteen different sectors have been specified and that trading
relations between production sectors in different regions are estimated on  bi-regional input-
output data (RUG/CBS, 1999). The fourteen sector-specific elasticities of substitution (s) and
the four parameters of the transport cost mark-up, 
p p c c , , , w u w u
, have been calibrated to the
baseline scenario for 2020. The SCGE model forecasts production and employment for each
municipality in the baseline scenario and any project variant. The difference between the two
is used as an estimation of the travel cost induced employment effects. In addition, it7
calculates the welfare effect of a project variant; the increase in utility that is achieved within
the country by the lower price index of consumption.
The first derived effect relates to labour migration of the mobile working population
caused by employment changes determined in the SCGE model (see Figure 2). Note that the
commuter location model predicts housing migration as a result of reduced travel times
starting with a given level employment in each municipality, whereas this effect measures
labour migration as a result of changes in employment opportunities. The residential locations
of the labour migrants are again estimated with the commuter location model. Total migration
is the sum of housing migration and labour migration.
The second derived effect relates to consumption-induced employment changes caused by
the total migration of workers. Due to lack of data, this effect is not determined at the level of
the 548 municipalities, but at level of the 40 nuts-3 regions in the Netherlands, using a 40x40
employment multiplier matrix of working migrants (see Oosterhaven, 2001, for details). This
matrix is also based on the 14  bi-regional input-output tables of the 12 provinces in the
Netherlands and the two mainport areas of Amsterdam and Rotterdam (RUG/CBS, 1999,
Eding et al. 1999). The total employment effect is the sum of the travel cost-induced and
consumption-induced employment effect.
5.  COSTS AND BENEFITS UNDER MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
Introduction
With the above-described methodology indirect economic effect may be estimated. They
provide direct useful information for policy purposes, but they fall short of a full welfare
evaluation of the transport schemes at hand. For this, an integral cost-benefit analysis
reckoning with market imperfections is needed. Here a full description of the methods used is
given, but details are only provided for the estimation of the important benefits related to the
imperfections of the labour market.
Investment costs, total exploitation costs and revenues
The investment costs have been estimated by a team of engineers on design and costs. The
cost of the inner and the outer ring project in the Randstad are estimated at 6835 and 9088
billion  euro. The Maglev between Schiphol and Groningen along the north-west and the
south-east of the IJsselmeer are estimated at 7308 and 6666 billion  euro, each estimate
including a mark-up for uncertainties and risk.
4
Total exploitation costs (as a percentage of the revenues) and the exploitation
revenues have been estimated by the NEI (2001a, 2001b) using the LMS travel demand
model. This model predicts a trip distribution matrix, provided that the marginal totals of the
trip distribution matrix, i.e., the spatial distribution of employment and population, are given.
This approach appeared to be problematic, as precisely that spatial distribution is endogenous
to changes in the transport system. In co-operation with the NEI, the initial estimates of the
                                                                
4 A consortium of four companies (HBG, Ballast Nedam, Siemens and ABN-AMRO) has offered to
build the first project (the inner ring) for 5110 billion euro, and to build the second project (the south-
east variant) for 4799 billion euro. These offers do not include costs for noise barriers and costs for
particular architectonic facilities.8
travel demand model have been adjusted for these endogenous changes in employment and
population. It should be noted that total exploitation costs and revenues of the new rail link
have been corrected for avoided exploitation costs and loss of revenues on existing rail links.
Time savings, consumer surplus and reduced congestion benefits
One of the prime reasons to invest in infrastructure is the time benefit for people. The time
benefits from changes in the transportation network may be estimated by means of the cost-
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where Cijm
0 and Cijm
1 denote the estimated flow from municipality  i to municipality j using
mode m and Tijm
0 and Tijm
1 denote the travel time using mode m, both respectively before and
after the change in the transport system.
In view of the differences in values of time and the different indirect economic effects
models for different travel motives, a distinction needs to be made between commuting trips,
commercial trips (for both business and consumption) and other trips, as well as between car
and public transport.
5 The time benefits of commuting trips have been calculated separately
for public transport using the results for Cijm
0 and Cijm
1 from the commuter location model.
The time benefits of other trips have been calculated separately for public transport
substituting the results of the travel demand model of the NEI into (3). The consumer surplus
changes due to faster business and shopping trips have been calculated with the help of the
SCGE model. Therefore the time benefits of commercial trips need not be calculated
separately, while the revenues of commercial trips need to be deducted from the consumer
surplus change to avoid double-counting them.
The time benefits for commuting, commercial as well as other trips by car are due to
reduced congestion. These benefits have been split into direct effects, as calculated under the
assumption of an unchanged spatial distribution of employment and population, and indirect
effects that are due to the changes in the spatial distribution of employment and population.
Note that if employment and population moves from relatively overcrowded to relatively
undercrowded regions all associated traffic also moves and may thus contribute to reduced
congestion.
Labour market benefits
Shifts in labour supply and labour demand, the two main effects of Figure 2, have additional
effects on the spatial efficiency of the national labour market in the Netherlands.
First, geographical matching benefits occur when, summed over all regions and
keeping regional labour supply constant, the match between demand and supply on regional
labour markets improves due to interregional shifts in labour demand. Disbenefits occur in the
reversed case. Four different cases may be distinguished (see Figure 3).
                                                                
5 Slow transport appeared to be of minor importance within this context, as congestion and the number
of people substituting car or public for slow transport appeared to be extremely small.9
Job benefits occur when labour demand shifts to regions with a labour supply surplus.
The increase in labour demand can be realised by mobilising school-leavers, the unemployed
and the inactive working age population without raising the wage rate. The equilibrium shifts
to the right along the labour supply curve.
Productivity benefits occur when labour demand shifts to regions with a labour
demand surplus. Withdrawal of labour from other economic activities is possible by bidding
up wages. A wage increase displaces other economic activities in the region whose labour
productivity is lower. Consequently, it is not employment that increases but wages and labour
productivity. The equilibrium shifts upwards along the labour supply curve.
Job disbenefits occur when labour demand decreases in regions with a labour supply
surplus. Unemployment will rise without affecting the wage rate. The equilibrium shifts to the
left along the labour supply curve.
Productivity disbenefits occur when labour demand decreases in regions with a labour
demand surplus. The number of vacancies will decrease because less productive, formerly
unfilled vacancies can now be filled. This has the effect of depressing wages, as a result of
which labour productivity will fall. The equilibrium shifts downwards along the labour supply
curve.
It should be stressed that geographical matching (dis)benefits only occur when labour
is immobile. When labour is willing to migrate as soon as employment opportunities in other
regions open up, then these ( dis)benefits disappear. Casual empiricism suggests that one
could realistically treat primary and secondary educated labour as immobile between regions.
That does not mean that this type of labour stays put; they do move often from one (public)
house to another, but they very rarely leave a region, especially due to barriers on the housing
market (De Galan and Van Miltenburg, 1991; Hughes and McCormick, 1987). In sum, job
(dis)benefits may occur for primary and secondary educated people, but not for the higher
educated as they are willing to migrate to other regions as soon as job opportunities in these
regions open up. Another assumption made in the empirical analysis is that the productivity
(dis)benefits are not as large as the job (dis)benefits if there were no labour demand surplus,
but only 10%.
Due to increased commuting distances, labour markets tend to increase in size. Wider
labour market benefits occur as firms are able to access a larger pool of workers. Qualitative
benefits occur as firms are able to access better skills. In the empirical analysis these benefits
have been approximated by the willingness to commute over longer distances. The latter has
been estimated by the larger number of workers crossing the borders of nuts3 regions and by
the assumptions that in 10% of these cases firms are able to access better skills and that labour
productivity due to these better matches increases by 10%.
Quantitative (dis)benefits occur when firms are able to fill more or less vacancies.
Again four different cases might occur. If commuting flows shift between regions which both
have a labour demand surplus or a labour supply surplus, the number of vacancies at the
national level remains the same. If commuting flows shift from regions with a labour supply
surplus to regions with a labour demand surplus, the number of vacancies decreases.
Conversely, if commuting flows shift from regions with a labour demand surplus to regions
with a labour supply surplus, the number of vacancies decreases. Just as with the geographical
matching (dis)benefits, these quantitative wider labour market (dis)benefits only occur when10
labour is immobile. Within this labour segment, the size of these (dis)benefits further depends
on the relation between the inactive and active part of the working age population and the
willingness to commute.
It is to be noted that this approach is not complete. First, short run effects may exceed
long run effects. Second, both sets of four cases assume either a labour demand surplus or a
labour supply surplus, while the UV or  Beveridge curve assumes a convex relationship
between these two variables. One improvement in future research would be to analyse the
labour market within the SCGE model based on recent work of Pissarides (2000). Finally, the
analysis does not consider international efficiency effects. These latter effects are taken from
Bröcker (quoted from TNO et al., 2000) and BCI (2001).
Housing market benefits
The housing market in the Netherlands has traditionally been a heavily regulated. In a free
market for land, external effects would cause too much land to be allocated to housing,
potentially leading to ‘urban sprawl’. Restrictive spatial planning in the Netherlands to avoid
‘urban sprawl’ appears to have two effects. First, it puts a constraint on consumer preferences.
Several consumer surveys have indicated that individual preferences for spacious houses on large
lots, particularly in the upper segment, are not fully satisfied. Second, it creates an artificial
scarcity of building land in comparison with agricultural land. Due to this artificial scarcity, an
additional economic rent emerges when transforming agricultural land into building land.
Unrestricted supply would result in equal land prices for each house category in comparable
locations, but the imbalance between supply and demand has resulted in higher prices per square
metre for expensive single-family houses on larger lots (Creusen, 1999).
Another feature of the Dutch housing market is the market power of property
developers. They buy agricultural land on prospective building sites to achieve a strong
bargaining position in acquiring the building order. As a result, property developers are able to
capture a substantial part of the scarcity rent on land. An indication for this is that total
construction prices tend to increase more rapidly than the actual construction costs (i.e., material
costs, wages and other (non-material) expenses; see Creusen, 1999). The consumer has no more
influence on this process than to buy or not to buy a completed house.
Public investment costs for developing new residential areas and building costs of
housing tend to be higher in densely populated regions and to be lower in sparsely populated
regions, respectively in central and peripheral regions. It should be noted that they also tend to be
higher in more urbanised than in more rural areas within the same region (Sievers and Keers,
1992). Generally, houses in densely populated regions are smaller and built on smaller lots, while
the neighbourhood is less green and the distance to green recreational areas is larger. Due to the
fact that the housing market is imperfect, a relocation of the Dutch population as a result of new
infrastructure, may lead to additional benefits (in addition to the time benefits) if on balance more
people move from densely to sparsely populated regions or, conversely, to additional disbenefits.
Environmental and non-monetised (dis) benefits
The main environmental (dis)benefits of a new rail link relate to noise, safety, landscape and
carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. Three different effects must be considered.
First, the construction and the service of a new rail link cause environmental disbenefits, also11
because it further increases the mobility of the Dutch population. By contrast, the substitution
of public for car transport due to a new rail link cause environmental benefits. Finally, the
relocation of employment and population may cause benefits or  disbenefits in different
regions. Although many of these effects are quantified, only few of them could be valued in
monetary units.
6.  RESULTS: INDIRECT EFFECTS
Figure 4 to 7 show the nuts-3 regions that benefit (red) and the nuts-3 regions that disbenefit
(blue) from the four different project variants in terms of employment and population. A
negative effect does not necessarily mean that people or jobs gets lost but that the autonomous
growth component will be lower than in the baseline scenario.
The first objective of the rail link between the four largest cities in the Randstad is to
strenghten the Randstad’s competitive position. The numbers underlying figure 4 and 5 show
that due to the redistribution of employment within the Netherlands, employment in the
Randstad increases by 1700 jobs in the inner variant and 1950 jobs in the outer variant. From
an international viewpoint, employment in the Randstad further increases by approximately
1300-1420 jobs (BCI, 2001). The second objective is to relieve the Randstad. In both variants
3000 people leave the Randstad. These figures are relatively small.
When looking at other regions and at intra-regional changes within the Randstad, we
may conclude that the urban rail link strengthens the process of suburbanisation. Within the
four big city agglomerations, the municipalities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and
Utrecht see their population decrease, whereas the surrounding municipalities close to a train
station see their population increase. This  suburbanisation process also extends to regions
adjacent to the Randstad. Whereas these regions see their number of jobs decrease, their
population increase. By contrast, the peripheral North hardly benefits from a fast rail link in the
Randstad, neither in terms of employment nor in terms of population. Its number of jobs
decreases slightly, its number of people increases only slightly.
The first objective of the fast rail link between Amsterdam and Groningen is to
stimulate the peripheral North. The numbers underlying figure 6 and 7 show that employment
increases by 3950 jobs in the south-east variant and by 8050 jobs in the north-west variant.
From an international viewpoint, employment in the North further increases by approximately
120 jobs in the North, as well as 80 jobs in Flevoland (NEI, 2000). The working population
increases by 4000 people in the south-east variant and 9400 people in the north-west variant.
In sum, the North indeed catches up. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say whether these effects
are large or small. In comparison with the autonomous growth component they are small,
while from the perspective of the existing population who wants to live in a quiet
environment, they are large. From a policy viewpoint, they are large as well: The only
measure that has created a comparable number of jobs in the North is the spreading policy of
government services in the 1970s (see Oosterhaven, 1996). What we may conclude from
these figures is that the north-west variant is approximately twice as effective as the south-
east variant, and that the centre-periphery project is more effective in creating jobs in the
North than the urban conglomeration project.12
The second objective is to relieve the Randstad. In the south-east variant 7045 people
leave the Randstad, whereas in the north-west variant the working population in the Randstad
increase by 100 people. In addition to this, we have found that the working age population
increases by 720 people when a TGV system is chosen in the south-east variant. These
contrary figures can be explained by the fact housing migration tends to be negative in the
Randstad, but travel cost-induced employment and therefore labour migration tends to be
positive, especially in the agglomeration Amsterdam. These results show two things. First, the
pull of a TGV train, contrary to a magnetic levitation train, appears to be insufficient to help
relieve the Randstad. Second, whereas in the north-west variant the areas centred round the
end points benefit from the new infrastructure, they do not or to a lesser extent in the south-
east variant. Conversely, whereas in the south-east variant the region between the end points
benefit from the new infrastructure, it does not or to a lesser extent in the north-west variant.
To illustrate the latter point, we further look at the regions of the North of North Holland
and Flevoland. The North of North-Holland is located between the Randstad and the North at
the north-west variant. Just as the North, it is a peripheral region with a rural character, a
shortage of jobs and a relatively high unemployment rate. A fast rail link through this region
does not appear to be of much help. The increase of its number of jobs and the size of its
working population is restricted to 150. On the other, in the south-east variant these numbers
decrease by 450 and 600, respectively.
Flevoland is located between the Randstad and the North at the south-west variant. A
fast rail link trough this region is extremely effective. Employment increases by 4300 jobs
and the working population increases by 12750 people. There are several explanations for
this. This region has three stations located at the new line, one of them not yet connected to
the rail network; the region has been reclaimed from the sea (today known as the “IJsselmeer”
lake) in the 1960s and 1970s and therefore has still lots of space; and the most populous
municipality of Flevoland (Almere) is located within 30 kilometres from Amsterdam and
Utrecht. For these reasons, the region is attractive to commuters. The results confirm this.
Whereas migration into the North consists of housing migration for 26% and labour migration
of 64%, migration into Flevoland consists of housing migration for 85% and labour migration
for 15%.
7.  RESULTS: SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
In this section we present the results of our social cost-benefit analysis. We have calculated
the net present value (NPV) in 2010, using a social discount rate of 4%
6 over a 30-year and a
50-year period, in prices of 2000. The problem with the 30-year period is that it does not
cover the life of the project. The problem with the 50-year period is that the social discount of
4% does not cover the risks of the project. Therefore, we have also calculated the internal
discount rate over both periods. The internal discount rate, especially over the 50-year period,
shows to which extent the social discount rate may be raised for risks without obtaining a
negative net present value. It is assumed that the construction of the new rail link takes place
over the period 2010-2015 and that exploitation starts afterwards. Indirect effects are assumed
                                                                
6 This discount rate is prescribed by the national government.13
to be zero in 2015 but to increase by 20%-points each year and to reach 100% in 2020.
Finally, it is assumed that investments costs are spread over the first five years of
construction; 33, 17, 20, 20 and 10 percent in the urban project and 10, 15, 30, 30 and 15
percent in the centre-periphery project (NEI, 2000, 2001).
Exploitation cost and revenues have been calculated at prevailing prices in public
transport by first class. The NEI has determined that a price increase of 30% would be
optimal from the point of view of the company running the line. Unfortunately, it has not
been investigated to which extent this price increase would dampen the indirect effects.
The time benefits of commuting trips in public transport have been calculated assuming
a value of time of 7.00 euro per hour, 2 trips a day, 220 working days each year and annual
growth rate of 1.1%.
7 The consumer surplus of commercial trips has been calculated using the
SCGE model and an annual growth rate of 1.6%. The time benefits of other trips have been
calculated starting with a value of time of 4,30 euro per hour, 285 trip days and a growth rate
of the value of time of 0.6%.
The labour market benefits have been calculated assuming that the proportion of higher
educated and of primary and secondary educated people is 35% and 65%, that labour
productivity grows at 2.3% each year (see table 1), and that a job values 36,192 euro for all
types of workers and 29,218  euro for a primary or secondary educated worker on a yearly
basis.
8
The determination of the housing benefits and of the indirect benefits of reduced
congestion is based on a previous study (Elhorst et al. 1999). The direct benefits of reduced
congestion are taken from NEI (2000,2001).
Table 3 show the results of our social cost-benefit analysis. From this table it can be
seen that total benefits of the urban project and of the centre-periphery project are close
together, excepting the  north-west variant of the latter type of project. By contrast, the
composition of the benefits is completely different. The urban project has higher exploitation
revenues and time benefits. Congestion is also reduced considerably, whereas the centre-
periphery project does only help indirectly due to the fact that on balance more people leave
the Randstad. The geographical productivity benefits and the qualitative wider labour market
benefits also appear to be higher. As many people substitute public for car transport, the
carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions diminish, as a result of which these benefits are
also positive. By contrast, in the centre-periphery project the negative effects dominate this
positive effect, as substitution is rather small. Benefits that appear to be lower or even
negative are the consumer surplus and the geographical net job benefits. This whole set of
results can be explained by the fact that the central region is more densely populated and the
periphery more sparsely populated, that the central region has a labour demand surplus and
the periphery a labour supply surplus and that, on average, product prices in the central region
have been estimated to be less than 20% higher and in the periphery to be more than 30%
                                                                
7 In the EC-scenario the real wage rate increases by 1.7% each year (table 1). The HCG (1998) has
determined that the income elasticity of the value of time for commuting trips is approximately 0.65.
Consequently, the value of time grows by 1.1% each year in the EC-scenario.
8 These numbers have been obtained dividing net national product by the total number of workers in
the Netherlands.14
higher due to monopolistic competition than they would have been assuming universal perfect
competition.
The investment costs depend on the length of the routes and the extent to which they are
build in an urban or rural environment. The latter explains why the urban project is more
expensive and also why the outer variant connecting city centres is more expensive than the
inner variant connecting the edges of the main cities. Connecting city centres, on its turn, has
the advantage that all benefits increase except for the congestion reduction. Train stations in
city centres cannot be reached easily, as a result of which fewer people will substitute public
for car transport and the congestion reduction will decrease. However, the impact of this
effect appears to be that large that, on balance, the benefits of both variants equalise.
The exploitation costs in the urban project are also higher than in the centre-periphery
project, as approximately twice as much trains are needed - the frequency with which the
trains are running is 10 versus 6 trains per hour - and approximately 15% more personnel.
Consequently, exploitation costs exceed the exploitation revenues in the urban project.
Adding up all monetised benefits and costs over a 30-year period shows that none of the
projects has a positive net present value, but as has been said this period does not cover the
life of the project. Adding them up over a 50-year period shows that the south-east variant of
the centre-periphery project has a positive net present value. It has a internal discount rate of
5.6%, which means that the social discount rate may be raised for risks by 1.6% without
obtaining a negative net present value.
The outer variant of the urban project has a large negative net present value, even over a
50-year period and should be rejected. The north-west variant of the centre-periphery project
has a small negative present value and an internal rate of return close to 4% over the 50-year
period. It should nonetheless be rejected, as the south/west variant appears to be a much better
alternative.
The inner variant of the urban project is a doubtful case. It has a small negative present
value and an internal discount rate close to 4% over the 50-year period. From Table 3 it can
be seen that these figures improve in the more pessimistic “Divided-Europe” and in the more
optimistic “Global Competition” scenario (see the description in table 1): the net present
value becomes positive and the extent to which the social discount rate may be raised for risks
amounts to 0.25% to 0.5%. Remarkably, the net present value also improves in the more
pessimistic scenario. The explanation is that the labour market benefits within the central
region are much higher in this scenario. If the unemployment rate is 4.5% or 2.8%, as in the
“European Co-ordination” and “Global Competition” scenario, the central region is
characterised by a labour demand surplus. Under this circumstance, the increase in product
demand due to new infrastructure does not lead to more jobs but to displacement of other, less
productive economic activities, both form a national and international point of view. If the
unemployment rate is 8%, as in the “Divided Europe” scenario, the central region is
characterised by a labour supply surplus, just as in the rest of the country. Under this
circumstance, every job can be filled without displacing others.
The above findings should be nuanced if the non-monetised benefits and costs would be
large and the evidence as a result would be otherwise, but that is not the case. First attempts to15
monetise the impacts on safety, noise and the build and natural environment have made clear
that these effects are relatively small and not necessarily negative. As these estimates are not
fully reliable, table 3 only contains qualitative estimates. The “++” or “--“ sign indicates that
the effect is not only positive or negative but also that the magnetic levitation rail system does
better or worse in comparison with its high-speed train counterpart. The “-/+” sign in the
urban project is used to indicate that the non-valued environmental effects are negative with
respect to the build and natural environment, and positive with respect to safety and noise, but
that the overall effect is uncertain.  Finally, the question of efficiency measured by the net
present value should be balanced against the question whether the regional distribution of
employment and income become more equitable. This question of fairness in distribution has
already been discussed in the last section.
In conclusion, we may say that the centre-periphery project is worthwhile, but that its
route should be carefully chosen. The SACTRA report (1999) has concluded that the effects
of transport improvements are subject to strong dependence on specific local circumstances
and conditions. It has been found that the south/west variant is much better than the north-
west variant, as it connects cities not yet connected to the rail network and the region between
both end points in the former variant is able to benefit more from the new infrastructure than
in the latter variant due to its attractive living environment.
The urban project appears to be rather risky. A positive result is only attainable for the
inner variant over a 50-year period under favourable economic conditions and then still for an
internal rate of discount that is not much higher than the social discount rate of 4%. This
result is generally considered too weak to go ahead with the magnetic levitation rail system in
the Randstad.
8. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
The results of both types of projects also throw more light on the potential outcome of the
German project connecting two large, but distant cities. Exploitation revenues and reduced
congestion will be low, as this project only competes with air transport. Time benefits due to
commuting and housing benefits will be negligible, as the distance between these two cities is
simply too large for commuting and only one stop has been planned. Geographical net job
benefits and net wider labour market benefits will not occur, as both cities will have the same
labour market characteristics. This means that already six types of benefits will be lost or
significantly reduce. Consequently, this type of project may expect to have a large negative
net present value and a low or even negative internal discount rate.
The last issue to discuss is the ratio between the benefits that have been computed in our
(almost) integral social cost-benefit analysis and the benefits that would have occurred under
the condition of perfect competition. Newbery (quoted from SACTRA, 1999, p.101) has
argued, starting with a theoretical model, that biases in the latter benefits due to the
prevalence of imperfect competition would generally be too small to worry about, as this ratio
is about 1.025, also known as the  Newbery critique. By contrast,  Venables and  Gasiorek
(quoted from SACTRA, 1999, p.101), also using a theoretical model, have found that most16
model permutations give ratios above 1.3 and that a few exceed 1.6. However, empirical
evidence corroborating these ratios is lacking. Moreover, these theoretical models do not
consider all additional welfare gains. They usually assume environmental and housing
externalities equal to zero and assume a market-clearing labour market.
9
From table 2 it has been derived that the ratio between both types of benefits is
approximately 1.2 in the urban conglomeration project and 1.8 in the centre-periphery project.
Although the last ratio appears to be quite high, it can be explained reasonably well. First,
mark-ups due to monopolistic competition instead of perfect competition were estimated to
range from 0.2 in central to over 0.3 in peripheral regions. These figures are comparable to
those found by Harris (0.16 to 0.29, see SACTRA, 1999, p.101). This means that the
additional gains in the urban-peripheral type of project may expected to be much larger.
Second, our analysis not only covers product markets, but also the labour market, housing
market and the transport market for passengers, which from a spatial viewpoint are anything
but perfect. In the centre-periphery project almost every additional effect appears to be
positive, including the indirect external effect on the transport market for passengers, as
people substitute public for car transport. This is an important empirical finding that, up to
now, is unknown and proves that the  Newbery critique was premature: New public
infrastructure between urban and peripheral regions, if its route carefully chosen, may well
contribute to national welfare due to large additional benefits caused by market imperfections.
9.  CONCLUSIONS AND CAUTION
The value of this paper is twofold. First, it is one of the first studies that has attempted to
measure the comprehensive net total of all social costs and benefits of new transport
infrastructure, taking account of the effects of imperfect competition. Second, it is one of the
first studies that has attempted to measure this net total for magnetic levitation rail systems. It
has been concluded that a centre-periphery project is worthwhile if its route is carefully
chosen, that an urban conglomeration project is rather risky, and that a project connecting two
large, but distant cities should be rejected.
Finally, we repeat the main assumptions on which the latter conclusion is based, as some
of these assumptions may have had the effect that the wider economic effects on which the
social cost benefit analysis is based are overestimated and some others that they are
underestimated (see Elhorst et al., 2000, for details). The results obtained with respect to
housing migration may have been overestimated, as they have been calculated at prevailing
prices and assuming that positive demand shifts on the housing market are accommodated in
the long run. The results may have been underestimated if the willingness to commute may
further grow in the future. The results obtained with respect to employment changes and in
addition labour migration may have been underestimated as the SCGE-model does not yet
take account of scale, cluster, and image effects. All wider economic effects may also have
                                                                
9  Newbery also does not deal with additional welfare gains accruing from linkage effects and
agglomeration effects and the entry and exit of firms (SACTRA, 1999, p.101).17
been underestimated as second-order effects were not taken into account, but as the first-order
effects are already relatively small these effects are almost negligible.
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Variables measured in annual percentage changes
Contractual wages 3.7 4.8 3.2
Consumer price index 2.0 3.3 1.4
Labour productivity 2.3 1.8 2.5
GDP 1.8 1.2 2,4
Variables measured in levels in 2020
Population (·1000) 17717 16205 16890
Employment (·1000) 7512 6334 7802
Unemployment 4.5% 8.0% 2.8%
Table 2: Average travel time (in minutes) between main cities along the proposed
trajectories (1).
From To Car PT Before South-east North-west
Groningen A’dam Airport 135 173 100 96
Car PT Before Inner ring Outer ring
Amsterdam The Hague 51 98 87 98
The Hague Rotterdam 33 55 51 54
Rotterdam Utrecht 64 75 74 61
Utrecht Amsterdam 40 76 76 76
(1) Including time neccesary to travel from origin to the station of departure and from station
of arrival to final destination.20
Table 3 Social cost-benefit analysis of two magnetic levitation systems, two variants each:













Exploitation revenues 1518 2034 1090 1357
Time benefits commuting 1340 1374 662 650
Consumer surplus (business/shopping) 198 282 862 1416
Time benefits other trips 347 645 164 161
Geographical net job benefits -459 -804 2278 1715
Geographical net productivity benefits 106 177 -431 -334
Qualitative labour matching benefits 168 199 36 32
Quantitative labour matching benefits 146 199 -162 266
International job benefits 401 401 310 310
International productivity benefits 173 173 133 133
Housing market benefits 107 101 26 358
Direct reduced congestion 1957 1193 0 0
Indirect reduced congestion 47 44 12 157
Environmental benefits (CO2 and NOX) 98 34 -160 -146
Total benefits 6148 6053 4820 6074
Investment costs 6189 8229 6440 5875
Exploitation costs 1898 2280 894 1094
Balance 2010-2040 -1938 -4456 -2514 -895
Internal discount rate 2.1 0.7 1.1 2.5
Balance 2010-2060 -47 -2775 -363 1690
Internal discount rate 4.0 2.5 3.7 5.6
Remaining benefits 1) ++ + ++ ++
Remaining costs 2) -/+ -/+ - -
Loss of leisure time 3) 250 700 -3600 -3400
Regional redistribution fair? p.m. p.m. p.m. p.m.
Balance 2010-2060
Pessimistic DE-scenario
1012 -1138 -1966 207
Balance 2010-2060
Optimistic GC-scenario
438 -2033 -886 2215
1)  Qualitative estimate of non-valued scale, cluster, image and second-order effects
2)  Qualitative estimate of non-valued environmental effects
3)  Loss of leisure time is minus the national number of jobs by which employment increases21
Figure 1: Proposed trajectories22
Figure 2 The relationship between the different indirect economic effects and further effects
    Housing migration                Travel cost-induced
  employment
        Labour migration
                                              Consumption-induced
           employment
Figure 3 The effects of interregional labour demand shifts when labour supply is immobile
a. Product demand increases Labour demand surplus Labour supply surplus
productivity benefits job benefits
   price wage wage
              output          labour       labour
b. Related product demand Labour demand surplus Labour supply surplus
decreases productivity disbenefits job disbenefits
   price wage wage
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